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Abstract
We consider a model of commercial television market, where private broadcasters
coexist with a public television broadcaster. Assuming that the public TV station
follows a policy of Ramsey pricing whereas the private stations are profit maximizers,
we consider the equilibria in this market and compare with a situation where the public
station is privatized and acts as another private TV broadcaster. A closer scrutiny of
the market for commercial television leads to a distinction between target rating points,
which are the prime unit of account in TV advertising, and net coverage, which is the
final goal of advertisers. Working with net coverage as the fundamental concept, we
exploit the models of competition between public and private price and quantity in order
to show that privatization of the public TV station entails a welfare loss and results in
TV advertising becoming more expensive.
Keywords: TV broadcasting, imperfect competition, Ramsey pricing, welfare compar-
ison.
JEL classification: L11, L82, L33
1. Introduction
During the last decades, the European markets for commercial television broadcasting
has undergone profound changes. In many countries, public television stations with little
if any income from advertising have lost their monopoly status through the opening up of
competition from commercial TV stations, and former budgetfinancing of TV broadcasting
has now been supplemented or replaced by commercial financing. As a consequence, the
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market for TV broadcasting services has obtained several characteristics of the American
market; the concern for number of viewers has come to the forefront, with its consequences
for choices of program profile and program quality, and the market for TV advertisement
has developed into a complex one with its own special features. On the other hand,
most European countries still retain some presence of public activity in this field, and the
resulting mixture of public and private activity adds new features to the market.
Commercial TV broadcasting is an example of a fixed cost technology; the program
structure has to be established, with its ability to catch and retain audiences, before
advertising time can be sold. As is well known to the academic profession, fixed cost
technologies have the drawback that textbook models of competition work poorly, and we
should expect some kind of imperfect competition in such markets. Moreover, attempts
to establish perfect competition in this market are futile due to the purely technological
conditions.
It might be added that TV markets display other forms of unusual performance; since
commercial TV broadcasting involves the general public which are important as potential
audiences but are not paying for what they are viewing, we may run into the situations
originally investigated by Steiner (1952), where a monopoly broadcaster is able to provide
a better program profile to the totality of viewers than competitive broadcasters having
to their disposal the same number of channels. We shall not involve this type of welfare
problem in the present investigation, since we do not introduce any measure of program
diversity, but such problems clearly add to the caveats in connection with privatizing public
TV stations.
In the paper, we begin our discussion with a treatment of markets with both public
and private television broadcasters by concentrating on the particular form of imperfect
competition prevailing, so that the peculiarities of the specific field of business, TV
broadcasting, is kept in the background. This leads to the concept of Ramsey-Cournot or
Ramsey-Bertrand competition, where public firms are guided by Ramsey pricing whereas
private firms are profit maximizers. When moving to the Ramsey-Bertrand situation (in
Section 3), we add the particular feature of the TV markets that production decisions
(choice of programs) have to be made before the sales can take place.
As might be expected, the presence of a public firm whoose choices are guided by
consumer welfare rather than by profits has considerable influence on the outcome; it might
however be argued that Ramsey pricing remains a theoretical construction and that real life
public TV stations can hardly be assumed to follow principles that they have never heard
about. We show in Section 4 that replacing Ramsey pricing by other objectives (“viewer
satisfaction”) does not change the results in a fundamental way.
In the sections to follow we turn to a more detailed consideration of the specific
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features of commercial TV broadcasting, the production of audiences with the purpose
of putting them to the disposal of advertisers. While most of the literature on imperfect
competition in TV broadcasting has used standard functional forms for cost and demand
functions, we have included the specific features of the sector to derive production and
cost functions which are relevant for the questions at hand. In Section 5 we discuss the
fundamental unit of account in TV advertising, the target rating point (TRP), as well as the
concept of net coverage which is not directly observable (as the TRP) but is what matters
to advertisers. Then, in Section 6 we return to the consideration of the market, showing
that with the specific properties of the market added to the general structure as described
in the earlier sections, the conclusions get enforced so that the changes from public/private
to fully private TV broadcasting emerges as having negative consequences for all involved
parties except the existing private broadcasters. We conclude in Section 7 by indicating
some directions of further investigation.
2. Ramsey-Cournot equilibria
In this section, we consider a situation where three firms, one public firm (indexed
by i = 1) and two profit maximizing private firms (indexed by i = 2, 3), compete in the
market for a consumption good. We assume that the public firm is suggested to supply the
good to the public in such a way that consumer welfare is maximized under the constraint
that the cost incurred should be covered by incomes from selling to the public. This would
be a standard case for Ramsey pricing (which of course in this initial case with a single
good reduces to a simple pricing rule), except for the existence of private firms competing
for market shares.
For reasons to become clearer in the following sections, we assume that there is
Cournot competition in the market, i.e. that the strategic variables in the market are the
quantities q1, q2, q3 supplied by the three firms. Actually this is in line with most of
the recent contributions to the literature on competition among TV broadcasters, cf. e.g.
Masson e.a. (1990), Papandrea (1997), Nilssen and Sørgaard (2000), Bourreau (2003),
Manga`ni (2003). Let the demand of the consumers be given by
q = D(p),
where p is the market price of the good, q is total quantity demanded, and D(·) is assumed
to be strictly decreasing, so that its inverse D−1 is well-defined. As is usual in models of
market behaviour, we measure consumer welfare at the pricepwith associated consumption
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q = D(p) by consumer surplus
S(p) =
∫ ∞
p
D(p) dp.
Then we may formulate a Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium in this market as a triple
(q01 , q
0
2 , q
0
3), with total supply q
0 = q01 + q
0
2 + q
0
3 and associated price p
0 = D−1(q0), such
that
(i) q01 maximizes S(p
0) under the budget constraint
D−1(q0)q01 − C1(q01) ≥ 0,
(ii) for i = 2, 3, q0i maximizes profits D
−1(qi +
∑
j∈{1,2,3}\{i} q
0
j )qi − Ci(qi).
As mentioned above, the public pricing rule becomes very simple indeed in the present
case: The choice q01 by the public firm should satisfy the first order condition
S′(D−1(q0))
1
D′(p0)
− λ
(
D−1(q0) + q01
1
D′(p0)
− C ′1(q01)
)
= 0,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, or, after inserting
S′(p0) = −q0 and rearranging
p0 − C ′1(q01)
p0
=
1
1
+
1
λ
1

, (1)
where  = −pD′(p)/D(p) is the elasticity of demand, and
1 = − pD
′(p)
D(p)− q02 − q03
= −pD
′(p)
q1
is the elasticity of (perceived) demand for firm 1. For the profit maximizing firms, first
order conditions are
D−1(q0) + q0i
1
D′(p0)
− C ′i(q0i ) = 0
which transform to the well-known condition
p0 − C ′i(q0i )
p0
=
1
i
, (2)
where again i = −pD′(p)/qi is the elasticity of perceived demand of firm i (given the
quantities supplied by the other firms).
Using that i = (q/qi) we see from (1) and (2) that the mark-ups are proportional
to
(
d1 − 1λ , d2, d3
)
, where di = q0i /q
0 is the market share of firm i. This simple result is
formulated as a proposition.
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Proposition 1. The mark-up Mi = p0 − C ′i(q0i ), for i = 1, . . . , m, satisfies
M1 = −
[
d1 +
1
λ
]
q0
D′(p0)
, Mi = − q
0
D′(p0)
di, i = 2, 3.
If marginal cost functions are identical and constant, then
d1 = d2 − 1
λ
.
We note that with identical and constant marginal cost, the market share of the public
firm must be smaller than that of each of the private firms, which consequently is smaller
than 1/3. Also it is seen that if all threefirms are active in the equilibrium, then λ ≥ 1; since,
the Lagrange multiplier expresses the marginal benefit, in terms of consumer surplus, of
an infinitesimal budget increase, this means that increasing the budget of the public station
and allowing it to supply more units according to this budget increase will lead to a
price reduction so that the gain to the consumers is greater than the cost of producing the
additional supply, once more reflecting the small market share of the public station.
If variable cost differs between firms, the market shares may be different; indeed, for
a smaller Mi in the private firms we may have that
d1
d2
=
M1
M2
− 1
λd2
becomes smaller than 1. This may happen for example in the case where there are different
choices of technique, and where the public firm has chosen a technique with high fixed
cost and small marginal costs, whereas the private firms have chosen low fixed cost and
high marginal cost. That such a choice may indeed be a rational one from the point of
view of the profit-maximizing firms, is seen when we extend the model in the next section
to take capacity cost into consideration.
Before doing so, we notice that if the public firm is turned into another private firm,
thus transforming the market to a standard case of Cournot competition, one might expect
that consumer welfare (as measured by consumer surplus) will not increase (since the
Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium maximizes consumer welfare). However, this reasoning
does not take into consideration the special structure of the equilibrium, according to
which each firm must choose optimally given the quantities of the others. In this context,
turning to another allocation such as that of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market shares
of the firms may have become more equal which may in its turn have an effect on the price
level. In the following example, this is indeed what happens.
Example 1. Let p = 1 − q be the demand function, and assume that the common cost
function is given by C(q) = c0 (so that marginal cost is 0). In a symmetric (with respect
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to private firms) Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium the price p and the quantity q1 supplied by
the public firm must satisfy
pq1 = c0, (3)
and the optimal choice q2 of the private firm 2 (equal to q3 by symmetry) satisfies
p =
1− (q1 + q2)
2
=
1− c0p − q2
2
, (4)
where we have inserted (3). From this equation and the demand relationship
c0
p
+ 2q2 = 1− p
we get that
p = q2 = q3 =
1
6
±
√
1
36
− c0
3
(5)
for c0 ≤ 112 ; for a Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium to exist we must further demand that
p · q2 = p2 ≥ c0. For c0 = 0, the public firm does not supply anything, turning the
equilibrium into a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with two firms. For c0 = 116 , we get a
Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium with
p = q1 = q2 = q3 =
1
4
,
and it is seen that for values of c0 greater than 1/16 we would get a smaller price, meaning
that profits of private firms cannot cover the fixed cost.
Incidentally, this equilibrium corresponds to the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium with 3 firms. If fixed costs are smaller than 116 , then the Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium
has a higher price and the public firm a smaller market share, meaning that private profits
are higher, and consumer welfare lower, than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. ©
3. Ramsey-Bertrand equilibria and capacity choice
The somewhat unintuitive feature of Ramsey-Cournot equilibria, according to which
equilibria with welfare optimizing behaviour from some of the actors in the market may
result in lower welfare than profit maximization, may to some extent be a consequence
of the rigid structure of the model, where the fixed cost is not open to choice. We now
open up for this possibility, using the well-known two-period framework where capacity
is chosen at t = 0, market price at t = 1. This slight extension of the model will also shed
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some light on the question of whether smaller private market shares could be expected in
some cases.
Suppose that at time t = 0, each firm chooses a technique, formalized as a triple
(c0, c, y), where c0 is a fixed cost, c is the associated unit cost of production at t = 1, and
y is capacity, meaning that production of firm i must satisfy qi ≤ y; there is a given set
T of techniques available to all the firms. We assume that firms choose prices at t = 1,
and that consumers choose the firm with lowest price and turn to sellers with higher price
only if demand is rationed at the lowest price. For simplicity, we assume that there is no
discounting between periods.
In this context, Ramsey pricing by firm 1 implies a choice (c01, c1, y1) at t = 0,
and a price p1 at t = 1, such that the resulting consumption pattern at t = 1 maximizes
consumer welfare given the prices chosen by the two other firms at t = 1. For the private
firms i, i = 2, 3, the choice of technique (c0i, ci, yi) and the price pi should be such that
profits are maximized.
To characterize the Ramsey-Nash equilibrium in this two-period game, we begin by
analyzing the situation at t = 1. First of all we notice that all firms produce at capacity,
i.e. qi = yi for all i; if i = 2, 3, this follows immediately from profit maximization and the
fact that reduced yi allows for a smaller c0i. For the public firm, reducing unused capacity
makes it possible to lower prices so that capacity is used up, and since some consumers
get lower prices and no consumers get higher (this follows from Bertrand competition
between the two private firms given their capacities and cost) this is an improvement for
the public firm.
It remains to find the equilibrium choices at t = 0, given that the capacity will be
used up in the next and final period. The cost of capacity y is the smallest number r such
that r = c0 + cy and (c0, c, y) ∈ T ; defining the cost function
C(y) = min{c0 + cy | (c0, c, y) ∈ T }, (6)
we see that the equilibrium choice of technique at t = 0 and price at t = 1 corresponds
to a choice of capacity, thus reducing the model to one of quantity choices in a one-period
setting. This is not surprising given that the extension to two periods follows the classical
interpretation of Cournot equilibria as subsequent choice of capacity and price (cf. e.g.,
Tirole (1988)). What is new is that the Ramsey-Bertrand equilibrium gives another solution
than the one found previously, since in the present setup all costs are variable.
In order to analyze Bertrand competition in the market considered, we need to specify
how consumers react on non-identical prices charged by the firms. For this we make the
standard assumption that consumers share the supply of the cheapest firms and only then
move to the more expensive, so that if prices charged are p = (p1, p2, p3) and capacities
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are y = (y1, y2, y3), then demand is
Di(p, y) = min

yi ,
1
|I(pi)| max
{
0, D(pi)−
∑
h∈I−(pi)
yh
}
 ,
where I(pi) = {j | pj = pi} and I−(pi) = {j | pj < pi}. Thus, firms sell to
capacity unless the consumers have already been served by firms charging lower prices.
To define consumer surplus in a situation with non-identical prices, we similarly assume
that consumers are served by lowprice firms first, so that if e.g. prices are pi1 < pi2 < pi3
for some permutation (i1, i2, i3) of (1, 2, 3), and all three firms are active, then
S(p, y) =
∫ yi1
0
[D−1(q)− pi1 ] dq
+
∫ yi1+yi2
yi1
[D−1(q)− pi2 ] dq +
∫ ∑
i
Di(p1,p2,p3)
yi1+yi2
D−1(q) dq.
The formulation of S(pi1 , pi2 , pi3) in cases where fewer than three firms are active is left
to the reader; they are not of central importance since in equilibrium, prices charged by
the firms will be the same.
We have the following result.
Proposition 2. An array ((c001, c01, y01), (c002, c02, y02); p, q1, q2) is a symmetric Ramsey-
Bertrand equilibrium if and only if (y01 , y02 , y02) is a Ramsey-Cournot equilibrium in the
one-period model with cost function C(y) given in (6), and c00i + c0i y supports C(y) at y0i .
Proof: If ((c001, c
0
1, y
0
1), (c
0
02, c
0
2, y
0
2); p, q1, q2) is a symmetric Ramsey-Bertrand equilib-
rium, then by the reasoning above, all firms sell at capacity, i.e., q1 = y01 , q2 = y
0
2 . If firm 1
could increase consumer surplus or if any firm i = 2, 3 could increase profits by choosing
another quantity with resulting market price (given that the others sell at capacity) and
cost according to C(y), then this would imply that another technique (c′0i, c
′
i, y
′
i) would
be better, given the techniques of the others, contradicting equilibrium. The converse is
shown by a similar argument.
Example 2. The impact of our change of model framework can be assessed if we
reconsider Example 1 in the present context. We assume that marginal cost c is 0 for any
choice of technique, but that there is a simple linear connection
c0 =
1
6
y
between c0 and y in any (c0, 0, y) ∈ T . Thus, capacity at t = 1 can be acquired at t = 0,
but at a linear cost.
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To find the Ramsey-Bertrand equilibrium in the two-period model, the simplest
approach is to use the computations in Example 1, which involve only the fixed cost
of firm 1. The highest consumer surplus is achieved at the smallest price satisfying (5) for
some c0. This value is seen to be p = 16 , obtained by setting c01 =
1
12 . The corresponding
capacity is y1 = q1 = 12 .
For the two other firms, optimal capacity choice is y2 = y3 = 16 , which requires a
period 0 investment of c02 = c03 = 136 . Incidentally, this investment is exactly recovered
by the sales revenue at t = 1.
It might be instructive to compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium which we
expect to be the outcome if the three firms all aimed at maximizing profits; the equilibrium
is the same as in Example 1, with p = q1 = q2 = q3 = 14 , and the total period 0 investment
is
c0 = 3 · 16 ·
1
4
=
1
8
,
which is smaller than the investment in the Ramsey-Bertrand equilibrium, which is
c0 =
1
12
+ 2 · 1
36
=
5
36
,
an observation which will be useful at a later stage. Finally, consumer surplus changes
from
1
2
·
(
1− 1
6
)2
=
25
72
to
1
2
·
(
1− 1
4
)2
=
9
32
.
The total profits have changed from 0 to 316 − 3 · 16 · 14 = 116 . ©
For the following, we need a generalization of the model which points to the
application to commercial television broadcasting. For this, we must introduce some
interdependency of firms in their choice of capacity and its associated cost, reflecting
the specific way of producing audiences through television broadcasting. The capacity
(interpreted as number of viewers available for advertisers) depends on the program profiles
chosen by the broadcaster in question and the program profiles of the other broadcasters.
Therefore, capacity is not chosen directly by the firm but emerges as a result of the joint
strategy choices of all broadcasters.
Thus, for each i we let Σi be an abstract set of strategies for firm i, and we let
Σ = Σ1 × Σ2 × Σ3. Let Ki : Σ → R+ and ci : Σ → R+ be the capacity and cost
mappings, so that if σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) is the array of strategies chosen by the public and the
private broadcasters, then the capacities are (K1(σ), K2(σ), K3(σ)) and the associated
costs (c1(K1(σ)), c2(K2(σ)), c3(K3(σ))).
As previously, we shall assume that at t = 1, firms compete by choosing prices when
selling the available capacity, and equilibrium (to be referred to as a Ramsey-Bertrand
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equilibrium) obtains when each firm i chooses strategy σ0i at t = 0 and price p
0
i at t = 1
so that
(1) the public firm maximizes consumer surplus under a budget constraint, that is
S(p, K(σ)) is maximal at σ01 , p
0
1 (over all σ1, p1 given σ
0
i , p
0
i , i = 2, 3) under
the constraints
p1D1(p, K(σ))− c1(K1(σ)) ≥ 0, D1(p, K(σ)) ≤ K1(σ),
(2) the private firms maximize piDi(p, K(σ))− ci(Ki(σ)) over σi, pi given σj , pj ,
under the constraint Di(p, K(σ)) ≤ Ki(σ), j = i, i = 2, 3.
An Edgeworth-Bertrand equilibrium in this model is an array (σ0, p0) such that all the
choices of the firms satisfy (2) above.
The game runs over two periods as previously, so that the strategy choices determine
capacity, whereas the second period this capacity is sold under price competition up to
capacity; for simplicity, we assume that period 2 cost is zero. Since the basic decision
variables are not capacities but strategies which in their turn determine capacities of all
firms, the standard approach using marginal revenue and cost with respect to capacity
changes will not work, and we need another way of assuring that equilibria exist in this
model.
To formulate the basic existence result, we need some more notation: Let
Ri((pj)j =i, σ′i, (σj)j =i) be the revenue to firm i given prices and strategies of the others,
when the price for firm i is such that capacity Ki(σi, (σj)j =i) is sold; for given prices and
strategies of the others, this is a function of the strategy σi alone (since the price is given
by the demand condition); it corresponds to the total revenue function in classical partial
monopoly models.
Proposition 3. Assume that for each i, Σi is convex and compact, and that for each i,
(i) Ki is convex in σi for fixed values of σj , j = i,
(ii) c is a convex function of capacity,
(iii) Ri is a convex function of σi for fixed values of pj and σj;
Then there exist Ramsey-Bertrand and Edgeworth-Bertrand equilibria in the model, and
these equilibria are such that p01 = p02 = p03 if all firms produce nonzero quantities of
output.
The proof of Proposition 3, which relies on standard fixed-point techniques, can be
found in the final section of the paper. The interdependence of the production decisions of
the firms – the strategy chosen by one firm affects not only its own capacity, but also those
of the other firms – makes the situation slightly different from standard partial models
of incomplete competition, and therefore we have chosen to give the full proof of the
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proposition. We shall make use of the proposition in Section 6 where the programming
outlays of the broadcasters take the role of the strategies, and where the program quality
of one broadcaster affects the sizes of not only its own audience but also of the audiences
of the competing broadcasters.
4. The case of a non-welfare-maximizing public firm
In the previous sections, we have been considering Ramsey-type equilibria where
the public firm is guided in its choice by the welfare of its costumers. While important
as a benchmark for pricing decisions in public enterprises, this equilibrium may not be
convincing as a description of actual market behaviour, given that the agents may have
slight if any knowledge of the welfare of its consumers. Nevertheless, some of the insights
gained in previous sections may still hold provided that the public firm acts sufficiently
different from ordinary profit maximizing behaviour (in which case we would be back in
the standard Cournot oligopoly). Here we consider the assumption of maximizing output,
also an objective which could hardly be defended as the objective of a public enterprise,
but on the other hand it has been used freely in the literature (which makes it non-exotic
as an assumption of behaviour), and in the application which we have in mind, that of
commercial television, it may even turn out to be a reasonably good approximation to
what public TV stations actually do.
Thus, in the present section, we retain the model of the previous section, where
decisions about capacity are taken at t = 0 and where prices are chosen and sales take
place at t = 1. There is one public firm and n ≥ 1 private firms, all with access to
the same technology T ; in the present case, we allow for the case of only one private
competitor to the public firm. As in the previous section, private firms are assumed
to maximize (intertemporal) profits, while the public firm maximizes output, or, what
amounts to the same in the present model, capacity. A symmetric equilibrium with public
output maximization is an array ((K01 , c
0
1, y
0
1), (K
0
2 , c
0
2, y
0
2); p, q1, q2) (where, as before,
subscript 1 indicates variables related to the public firm and subscript 2 variables related
to the private firms), such that
(i) there is no alternative strategy choice ((K1, c1, y1), p′) with q′1 > q1, (K1, c1, y1) ∈
T and (p − c1)q′1 − K1 ≥ 0, where q1 (q′1) is the sale of firm 1 given the strategy
(K02 , c
0
2, y
0
2) of the private firms and the price p (p
′),
(ii) each private firm maximizes profits by choosing ((K02 , c
0
2, y
0
2), p), given the choices
of the other firms, public or private.
The following is an obvious and well-known consequence of the sales-maximizing
behaviour of the public firm, and we omit the proof.
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Proposition 4. In any symmetric equilibrium with public output maximization total
sales exceed that of an Edgeworth-Cournot equilibrium.
Example 3. Let us find a symmetric equilibrium with public output maximization
in the special case considered in Example 2 of the previous section, for which we have
already found the Edgeworth-Cournot equilibrium, which was symmetric with K = 1/24,
q = 1/4, and p = 1/4.
To find the equilibrium where the public firm maximizes its output, we may use (5)
once again, since maximizing q under the relevant constraints corresponds to finding the
maximal feasible value of K, which is the same value 1/12 that we found in the previous
section, something which is due to the extreme simplicity of the example and will not
be the case in general. But at least here we obtain that the otherwise rather irrationally
behaving public firm will achieve a welfare maximum that would not be realized if the
firms were all private and maximized profits. ©
It might be noticed that apart from the effects considered above, the output maximizing
public firm will be induced to keep cost down, both that of capacity building and the current
cost at t = 1. Indeed, if these costs were to increase due to organizational slack, then this
would have reverse effects on output, and the competing private firms would increase their
market shares.
5. The cost structure of a television broadcaster
In the present section we begin a closer investigation of the cost structure of a
commercial television broadcaster. The aim of this is not only to justify the model of
market competition and pricing discussed in the previous sections, but also to obtain some
more insight with regard to the cost structure and its impact on the market behaviour.
Shortly speaking, the costs of a television broadcaster is connected with the programs that
are broadcasted (we are here neglecting administration costs, which in real life are by no
means negligible, but which do not enter into our arguments in a way different from what
is completely standard), but the output of the television broadcaster, to which these costs
should be ultimately assigned to get a model of the type considered above, are audiences
created by these programs and delivered to advertisers. We begin our discussion with these
latter aspects of the production process.
As is well known, what is sold by television broadcasters to the advertisers (or rather,
to the agents commissioned by the advertisers to take care of their advertising program)
is target rating points (TRP), usually measured as 1 percent of the relevant population. In
real markets, TRPs may be distinguished as to age, sex and other characteristics, and the
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broadcasters sell several products which are derived from the basic TRPs; we shall assume
here that there is only one type of TRP sold in the market.
We assume that a television broadcaster has a total capacity of M spots, advertise-
ments which for simplicity are assumed all to have the same length in time. In order to
sell a certain number τ of TRPs, the advertisement may have to be shown several times.
If π is the proportion of all television viewers watching the channel, then the number of
times the advertisement must be shown to reach the proportion τ is
k = τ/π (7)
(which for π small compared to τ may be considered as integer valued). When buying
TRPs, the advertiser obtains gross coverage in the sense that some viewers may have seen
the spot several times. Clearly, the proportion of viewers becomes a crucial parameter
when selling TRPs. The advertisers may buy more than 100 TRP (as a matter of fact, they
most often do) for several reasons, the simplest being that they are interested in sending
repeated messages to the viewers.
Matters are, however, slightly more complicated than that; the advertiser on her side
is not merely interested in TRPs, which are the units purchases, but is oriented towards the
net coverage obtained, which is different from the gross coverage expressed by τ . Indeed,
if π expresses the probability that a television viewer watches the given channel, and the
event of watching a channel is independent over days, then the probability of having seen
the advertisement after k broadcasts is
ν(k) = 1− (1− π)k, (8)
which gives us the net coverage in this particular situation.
Let p be the price of a TRP. Using (7) we get that the cost of reaching ν per cent of
the population, whereby all the reached individuals are different, is found by solving the
equation
1− (1− π) τπ = ν (9)
for τ and multiplying by p, the price of TRPs with the channel considered. We obtain the
expression
C(ν) = pπ
log(1− ν)
log(1− π)
for the cost function as seen from the view of the advertiser. If, as assumed in the present
model, π is a constant, then the cost to the advertiser of buying television audiences is not
linear in the size of the audience but has the shape of log(1−ν) which is a convex function
of ν.
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In this calculation, we have taken the price of a TRP as given and computed a non-
linear payment scheme for net coverage. Alternatively, we might also take the viewpoint
that what the advertiser buys is net coverage, and comparing the cost of advertisement in
different competing channels, what should matter is the cost of net coverage rather than the
somewhat irrelevant cost of TRP. If the television channels are responsive to this advertiser
behaviour, then they should operate with a price of net coverage and then work back to the
TRP price. Indeed, if ρ is the price per percentage of net coverage, then the implicit price
per TRP connected with a purchase of net coverage ν is
p(ν) =
ρ log(1− π)
π
ν
log(1− ν) .
Clearly, the function p(ν) is non-linear, with a price per unit decreasing in ν, and inserting
(8), we get a price schedule by which the price paid per TRP depends on the number of
TRPs purchased, allowing for substantial rebates when this number is large.
This theoretical price schedule corresponds rather well – the extreme simplicity of the
underlying assumptions taken into account – to the price structure seen in real television
advertising markets. The non-linear price structure arises, at least in the present model,
from a linear price structure on the commodity that is really traded. The fact that purchases
are made in terms of TRP is connected with the observability problem: TRPs may be
verified (statistically), while net coverage cannot be verified, at least not at the current
state of the technology. Since net coverage is what the advertisers want, the competition
among TV broadcasters must be phrased in terms of prices on net coverage rather than on
TRPs which anyway are not easily comparable between broadcasters.
6. Programming outlays and market equilibria
In order to get the full picture of the cost structure of the television broadcaster, we
need to take the program cost into account. Programs are used to attract audiences which
then are put into the disposal of advertisers. The seminal model by Steiner (1952) of viewer
choices emphasizes that viewers have different preferences with respect to different types of
programs, and that the choice of the broadcaster reflects these differences; this point of view
has been further developed in the literature, see e.g. Spence and Owen (1977), Owen and
Wildman (1992). For our present study, we shall be satisfied with a much more simplistic
way of representing the strategic aspects of program choice: We assume that there is a
simple way of attracting viewers, namely by choosing more expensive programs, so that
the probability πj that the representative viewer is watching the programs of broadcaster
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j is given by
πj =
δˆj∑
h∈J δˆh
for δj ≥ δ0, (10)
and πj = 0 for δj < δ0. Here J is the (finite) set of broadcasters, δh is the program cost of
broadcaster h, h ∈ J , and δˆh = max{δ0, δh}; we assume thus that there is a minimal outlay
δ0 which is necessary in order to perform broadcasting, and that viewers are attracted to
the different broadcasters actually in business in proportion to their programming outlays.
Throughout the following, we shall assume that δj ≥ δ0 for all j.
Needless to say, this formalization of the relationship between program cost and size
of audience does away with many interesting aspects of real life, such as the complicated
choice of program profile and program qualities (as discussed e.g. by Papandrea (1997),
Bourreau (2003) and Manga`ni (2003). On the other hand, it may be considered a first
approximation, and similar approaches have been found useful in the treatment of related
problems (such as patent races, see e.g. Reinganum (1989), where the relative amounts of
money spent on research are assumed to determine the probability of getting the patent).
In order to relate the cost of attracting audiences to the entities which are sold to
advertisers, we must use the formalism developed in the previous section. We have assumed
that there is a given number M of broadcasts available (typically fixed by rules determining
the maximal amount of advertisement admissible) which is common to all broadcasters,
which by (7) corresponds to the TRP capacity Mπ. This total number of broadcasts can
then be divided into a number k of campaigns; these are sold to the advertisers, and the
viewer probability πj determines the number T (πj) of campaigns and hence the capacity of
the broadcaster in the following way: Assume that there is fixed value ν0 of net coverage
to be attained by a campaign. Given the probability πj , we find the number k(πj) of
broadcasts by solving for k in
1− (1− πj)k = ν0,
which gives us
k(πj) =
log(1− ν0)
log(1− πj) .
The capacity of broadcaster j may now be found as T (πj) = M/k(πj), and conversely,
we may find the viewer probability πj associated with a capacity Tj as
πj = 1− (1− ν0)
Tj
M . (11)
To find the cost associated with building capacity Tj we use (10) to determine the
programming outlays δj of broadcaster j needed to achieve viewer probability πj given
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the outlays δh for h = j,
δj =
(
1
πj
− 1
)−1 ∑
h=j
δh;
inserting from (11) we have a cost function C(Tj) for achieving the capacity Tj of the size
Cj(Tj) =
(
(1− ν0)−
Tj
M − 1
) ∑
h=j
δh. (12)
It may be noticed that cost of capacity depends linearly on the outlays of the other
broadcasters; in our model broadcaster competition works on several planes, not only
through the prices (here the price of campaigns yielding the standardized net coverage) but
also through the cost externality – a broadcaster increasing the outlays on programming
to obtain a larger capacity automatically increases capacity costs of all the competing
broadcasters. Since κ = (1 − ν0)−1/M is a constant, the expression in the bracket takes
the form κTj − 1 which shows that cost is exponential in capacity Tj for any given level
of programming outlays of the other broadcasters.
With the structure of production and cost as outlined above, the model fits into the
framework developed in Section 3. Strategy sets of the broadcasters are programming
outlays determining capacity together with price decisions when capacity is sold. We
need the revenue assumption from Proposition 3: Define Ri((ρj)j =i, δ′i, (δj)j =i) as the
revenue for broadcaster i when the competitors have chosen prices ρj and outlays δj ,
j = i. The assumption that this function is convex in δ′i is basically an assumption on the
well-behavedness of the demand function and will be satisfied for simple specifications of
demand as those of the examples in previous sections. The remaining assumptions of the
proposition follow from the specific properties of the model. Application of Proposition
3 then gives us the following:
Proposition 5. Assume that Ri((ρj)j =i, δ′i, (δj)j =i) is convex in δ′i. Then there
are Edgeworth-Bertrand and Ramsey-Bertrand equilibria, and all such equilibria are
characterized by equal prices for all active firms.
While existence of equilibria is reassuring, it does not tell us much about the properties
of each type of equilibrium and how they compare. For this, we need some additional
assumptions. The one which we use is a counterpart – for the present model with
interdependent supply – of classical conditions that marginal revenue is smaller than
demand and hence smaller than marginal consumer surplus. Note that revenue and
consumer surplus are both homogeneous of degree zero in δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3), depending
only on the distribution of programming outlays but not on its overall level.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that at all δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3) and all prices ρ (common to all
broadcasters)
∂
∂δ1
S(ρ, T1(δ), T2(δ), T3(δ))− ∂
∂δ1
R1(ρ, δ1, δ2, δ3)
is positive, and that both quantities are decreasing in δ1/(δ2 + δ3). Let (δ∗, ρ∗) be a
Ramsey-Bertrand equilibrium. Then there is an Edgeworth-Bertrand equilibrium (δ0, ρ0)
with maxi δ0i < maxi δ∗i and ρ0 > ρ∗.
Proof: Let δ∗ = δ∗2 = δ
∗
3 ; by our assumption on the quantity in (12), we have that
δ∗ < δ∗1 . Define R(t) for t ≥ 1 as
R(t) = D−1(3T (tδ∗, tδ∗, tδ∗))T (tδ∗, tδ∗, tδ∗),
that is the revenue to any of the broadcasters at the programming outlay (tδ∗, tδ∗, tδ∗),
and let MR(t) be the partial derivative of R(t) with respect to programming outlay of any
broadcaster, evaluated at (tδ∗, tδ∗, tδ∗). Clearly, at t = 1, marginal revenue from changing
programming outlays, MR(1) exceeds the cost of increasing programming outlays by a
small unit, which is 1. Next, let δ
∗
= δ∗1 ; then at the programming outlays (δ
∗
, δ
∗
, δ
∗
),
we would have that marginal revenue with respect to programming outlays is smaller
than marginal cost, so that MR(δ
∗
/δ∗) < 1, and it follows by continuity that there is a
symmetric Edgeworth-Bertrand equilibrium with outlays (t0δ∗, t0δ∗, t0δ∗) and some price
ρ0. Since MR(t0) equals marginal revenue w.r.t. capacity multiplied by the derivative of
capacity with respect to programming outlay at (δ0, δ0, δ0), and the latter is higher at δ0
than at δ∗, we conclude that marginal revenue w.r.t. capacity is higher at δ0 than at δ∗, so
that ρ∗ < ρ0.
7. Concluding comments
In the preceding sections, we have treated a model of imperfect competition between
commercial television broadcasters. The specific feature of the model has been the
presence of one broadcaster under public control, which consequently acts according
to other objectives than the purely private broadcasters. Given this situation, we have had
to investigate not only the workings of the market for commercial television broadcasting,
but also the consequences in terms of equilibrium concepts of the presence of both public
and private firms with each their specific objectives.
The latter problem has been confronted by considering the notion of a Ramsey
equilibrium, where the public firm chooses Ramsey prices facing residual demand from the
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private firms, which on their side maximize profits on their residual demand schedules. In
the present paper we have added a feature which seems central to markets for commercial
television broadcasting, namely that caa˚acity (total amount of possible audiences to be
exposed to commercials) must be established before the sale can take place and cannot be
changed without unreasonable cost once it is put into place. This means that the markets
are more properly studied in the context of a two-period model with an initial decision
on capacity-building followed by a second period where the given capacity is sold, now
under price competition.
Clearly, many simplifications have to be accepted in order to keep the model tractable;
among these simplifications is our assumption that there are only standardized campaigns
for sale, where the standard is a given percentage of the population actually reached (in
terms of net coverage). On the other hand, with this assumption we can specify a model of
production of commercial television broadcasting which reflects the basic facts of the sector
in a more direct way than most contributions which are satisfied with abstractly specified
demand and cost schedules not derived from the underlying technological conditions.
The outcome of our modelling is that production is inherently interrelated; the amount
of advertising campaigns that can be sold depends on the attractiveness of programs to
viewers and this again depends on programming outlays; increasing program quality not
only increases your audience but at the same time diminishes those of your competitors.
This interrelationship is not entirely standard in the industrial organization literature, and
therefore we have felt that it was necessary to check the existence of the equilibria which
we study, even though we deal with simple partial models.
The ultimate goal of this modelling was of course to compare the situation sketched
initially, where one broadcaster was public and the remaining private, with the situation
after privatization. Even if such a comparison has not really been on the agenda in
connection with political decision making, given that the received wisdom prescribes
privatization as a means towards increased competition and thereby to enhanced welfare
and effectiveness, it nevertheless seems worthwhile to see what would emerge from using
economic theory. And indeed the results are not quite in line with the conventional wisdom:
Privatization will lead to higher prices for advertising and to lower quality of television
programs. Shortly speaking, this privatization issue is for once a very clear-cut case, since
everybody looses except the existing private television broadcasters (and possibly the new
one if this will not be one conglomerate of the existing ones).
There are of course several reasons why it works this way, but none of them are
particularly subtle. For one thing, the commercial television broadcasting market is not
one of perfect competition. In smaller countries, the market is so small that only a few
broadcasters can operate with profits, and it is sufficiently complicated that competition
authorities have little chance of tracing what is actually going on; even so, tacit agreements
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would tend to send the prices towards a monopoly level. This situation is on the other
hand upset by the presence of a non-profit organization, which under suitable circumstances
will create competition as a by-product of its activities. Eliminating this organization or
turning it into a standard profit maximizer, the effects disappear and the market turns into
a traditional oligopolistic one, with all the well-known effects for prices and consumer
welfare.
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8. Proof of Proposition 3
In this section, we give a proof of existence of an equilibrium (of the Ramsey-
Bertrand as well as the Edgeworth-Bertrand type) in the model described in Section 3 with
interdependence of capacities.
Proof of Proposition 3: For i = 1, 2, 3, define the correspondences ϕi :
Σ× [0, P ]3 → Σi by
ϕi(σ, p) = {σ′i | Ri((pj)j =i, σ′i, (σj)j =i)− c(Ki(σ′i, (σj)j =i)) > πi(σ, p)},
where
πi(σ, p) = pimin{Ki(σ), Di(p)} − c(Ki(σ)),
and where Ri((pj)j =i, σ′i, (σj)j =i) is the revenue to firm i given prices and strategies
of the others, when the price for firm i is such that capacity is sold. Next, define
λi : Σ× [0, P ]3 → [0, P ] by
λi(σ, p) = {p′i | Di(p′i, (pj)j =i) > Ki},
and let ψi : Σ× [0, P ]3 → [0, P ] be given by
ψ(σ, p) =
{ {p′i ∈ λi(σ, p) | p′i > pi} if pi ∈ clλi(σ, p)
λi(σ, p) otherwise.
For i = 1, we define γ1 : Σ× [0, P ]3 → Σ1 by
γ1(σ, p) = {σ′1 | p1 min{K ′1, D1(p)} < c(K ′1)}
and κ1 : Σ× [0, P ]3 → Σ1 by
κ1(σ, p) =


{σ′1 ∈ γ1(σ, p) | S(p, K ′1, K ′2, K ′3) >
S(p, K1, K2, K3)} if σ1 ∈ clγ1(σ, p),
γ1(σ, p) otherwise.
where we have used shorthand notation K ′i = Ki(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3), Ki = Ki(σ), i = 1, 2, 3.
It is easily checked that each of the correspondences ϕi, ψi, i = 1, 2, 3, as well as the
correspondences κ1, have convex (possibly empty) values and open graph. Moreover, they
are irreflexive in the sense that for all (σ, p), σi /∈ ϕi(σ, p), pi /∈ ψi(σ, p), σ1 /∈ κ1(σ, p).
We now proceed to exhibit arrays (σ, p) where all relevant correspondences have empty
values, and study their properties:
Edgeworth-Bertrand equilibrium: Consider the correspondence
ϕ1 × ϕ2 × ϕ3 × ψ1 × ψ2 × ψ3 : Σ× [0, P ]3 → Σ× [0, P ]3.
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By the fixed point theorem of Ky Fan (see e.g. Borglin and Keiding, 1976) there is (σ0, p0)
such that ϕi(σ0, p0) = ∅, and ψi(σ0, p0) = ∅, i = 1, 2, 3. From the latter property, we
have that Di(p0) = Ki(σ0), and since ϕi(σ0, p0) = ∅, we have that there is no other
strategy σ′i for firm i which would increase profits. Thus, the array (σ
0, p0) satisfies the
conditions for an Edgeworth-Bertrand equilibrium.
Assume that there are i = j with p0i > p0j and both firms active. Then we would
have a contradiction to φj(σ0, p0) = ∅ or Dj(p0) = Kj(σ0) since consumers will want
to buy more at the lower price before using the seller with a higher price. We conclude
that p01 = p
0
2 = p
0
3 if all firms are active.
Ramsey-Bertrand equilibrium: Here we work with the correspondence
κ1 × ϕ2 × ϕ3 × ψ1 × ψ2 × ψ3 : Σ× [0, P ]3 → Σ× [0, P ]3,
for which there is (σ∗, p∗) such that κ1(σ∗, p∗) = ∅, ϕi(σ∗, p∗) = ∅, i = 2, 3, and
ψi(σ∗, p∗) = ∅, i = 1, 2, 3. Reasoning as above, we have that the profit maximization
conditions are satisfied for each private firm. For i = 1, we have from ψ1(σ∗, p∗) = ∅
that Di(p∗, K(σ∗)) = Ki(σ∗) and that σ∗1 maximizes consumer surplus given p
∗
i and
σ∗i , i = 1, which are the conditions for a Ramsey-Bertrand equilibrium. The fact that
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
∗
3 if all firms are active follows by the same reasoning as above.
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